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Because of the broad jurisdiedon American courts have asserted in cases
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they have been called a
Shangri-la for 'foreign-cubed" class actions with little connection to the United
States. Over the past fory years, the standards used by American courts to
determine their jurisdiction in international securities disputes have evolved,
culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court's Morrison decision of 2010. The
new transactional test promulgated in Morrison replaced all of its predecessor
tests, from a test measuring whether the conduct in queston took place in the
United States to a test measuring whether the effects of the conduct were felt in
the United States, to a combined conduct-effects test. This new transactional test
is unsatisfactory, however, because depending on how it is interpreted, it is either
too narrow to protect American investors as Congress intended in Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, or too broad to resolve the ambiguities that
plagued the conduct-effects test. This Aticle proposes a new efects test that will
resolve ambiguities, protect American investors, and refrain from asserting
American judicial jurisdicion overseas contray to prinaples of international
comity. Though the effects test would not grant private parties a cause of action
against violators operaing in the United States but who exclusively defraud
those overseas, Congress has already granted authorit to federal agencies to
pursue such bad actors. The effects test is also in accordance with princples of
other importantjurisdieions, such as the European Union, and could serve as a
basis for an internadonal agreement on jurisdiction in international securities
cases.
* Professor of Law, Bocconi University Law School, Milan, Italy, and the Pennsylvania State
University Dickinson School of Law; Vice Director, Paolo Baffi Research Center; Research
Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Brussels, Belgium.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, U.S. federal courts have grappled with the
extraterritorial reach of American securities laws. In particular, courts have
struggled with Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [the
"Exchange Act"].' The application of this rule to class actions with an
international dimension has proved to be complex and uncertain. Courts
have developed the "conduct-effects test," 2 a two-pronged test - or, as
1. Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of any act or omission to defraud or deceive in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. S 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
2. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1995). For a further discussion
of the history behind the two tests and the eventual combination of the two tests in Itoba, see Dennis
R. Dumas, United States AntifraudJurirdiction over Transnational Secuniies Transactions. Merger of the Conduct
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more aptly suggested by one court, "approach" 3 - to determine subject-
matter jurisdiction and the scope of Section 10(b) in international disputes.
Under this approach, U.S. courts have adjudicative jurisdiction when either
substantial conduct relevant to the violation has been carried on in the
United States, when the alleged fraud has caused some damage in the
United States to American plaintiffs, or both.4 These standards for
determining when a U.S. court has adjudicative jurisdiction have not been
uniformly defined and require a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis. 5
The conduct-effects approach raised concerns in two distinct but
interrelated aspects. First, the absence of bright-line rules led to
inconsistent, if not glaringly contradictory, results. Second, critics claim the
conduct-effects approach excessively expanded the scope of the securities
laws to cover transactions that the United States had little interest in
regulating. 6 This overreaching assertion of jurisdiction could be considered
a form of legal imperialism that set the United States on a collision course
with the legitimate interests of other sovereign nations and undesirably
distracted the limited resources of the American legal system from more
proper purposes. Critics aimed their concerns in particular at "foreign-
cubed" 7 securities class actions: collective lawsuits, often attorney-driven
rather than client-centered, in which foreign investors sued foreign
defendants in the United States for misrepresentations connected to
transactions occurring abroad.8 Adoption of the conduct-effects approach
thus led the federal judicial system to move toward becoming, in the words
and Effects Tests, 16 U. PA. J. INTL Bus. L. 721, 723-31 (1995).
3. In Kautbar SDB BHD v. Stemnber, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit noted
that the term "approach" is more accurate because "test" is too inflexible to characterize the present
state of the case law.
4. See, e.g., Itoba Ltd., 54 F.3d at 123-24. See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the "conduct test"); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (1968) (announcing the "effects test"), rnod on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cit. 1968) (en banc).
5. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-80 (2010).
6. Regarding the broadness of the effects test, see W. Barton.Patterson, Note, Dejining the Reach of
the Securites Exchange Act- Extraterritorial Appkation of the Antifraud Prosions, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
213, 226 (2005) ("A problem with the effects test is that it broadens with every technological advance
that makes United States investors and markets more accessible tb the world. This is especially true
as the extent and scope of the effects test have never been adequately defined.").
7. Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Inestors in. Federal Securiiies Class Actions, in
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES (Number B-1442) 91, 96 (Practicing Law
Institute ed., 2004) (using the term "foreign-cubed").
8. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Muldnational Class Actions under Federal Secnriies Law. ManagingJmisdicdonal
Conect, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 26 (2007) ("Critics were particularly concerned that
plaintiffs' attorneys, rather than plaintiffs themselves, were managing class actions, with the frequent
result that case outcomes enriched the attorneys rather than providing meaningful compensation to
the plaintiff class.").
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of Justice Scalia, the "Shangri-la of class-action litigation for lawyers
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets."9
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist famously defined Rule 10b-5 as a "legislative
acorn" from which a "judicial oak" developed.' 0 In the view of its critics,
the conduct-effects test was an overgrown branch of that tree, one that
trespassed on the jurisdiction of other nations.11
In August 2010, the Supreme Court picked up the shears in Momyison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. - its first case on foreign-cubed securities
class actions. The Morrison decision disposed of forty years of case law and
substituted for the conduct-effects test what Justice Stevens, in a
concurring opinion, defined as a new "transactional test."12 This
revolutionary approach limited the application of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act to only parties using manipulative or deceptive devices in connection
with "the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States."13
This Article argues that both the previous conduct-effects test and the
new transactional test are incorrect and proposes that a third solution,
based solely on the effects of the transaction, should be adopted. While
the conduct-effects test can be blamed for its fuzziness and potentially
excessive reach, the rigid solution now provided by the Supreme Court is
not without its own flaws.
To begin, the textual foundation of the transactional test, supposedly
derived from the text of the Exchange Act, is at least as fragile as the
foundation of the conduct-effects test. Questions can also be raised
concerning the alleged bright-line nature of the transactional test. The
most serious concern with the transactional test, however, is that the
Supreme Court's approach is too narrow, undermining the investor
protection goals of the securities laws. As this Article will illustrate,
Morrison can deprive American investors who buy securities from an
American issuer of the protections of the securities laws merely because
the transaction occurs abroad. It would take more than a little text-twisting
to accept that this is what Congress intended in enacting the securities
9. Monison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
10. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
11. Concerning the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, see, e.g., Kun Young
Chang, Muldnadonal Efonement of U.S. Securiies Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of
Extratenitopial Sulfect-Matr nri rdict'ion, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 100-01 (2003) ("[The
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws may give rise to a breach of international comity as
well as cause frequent conflicts with the sovereignty of other countries.') (internal citations omitted);
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Redpmaib: Rethinking the Intensadonal Reach of Secaides
Reguladon, 71 S. CAL. L REV. 903, 914 (1998) ("[T o the extent the United States seeks to regulate
investment activity abroad, it cannot help but interfere with the regulatory systems of other
countries.').
12. Monison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
13. Id (emphasis added).
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laws. This Article is not alone in this criticism: The concurring opinion in
Morrison also expresses similar concerns about the majority's position. 14
Yet, contrary to what that concurring opinion seems to suggest, this
Article will not argue that the conduct-effects test should have been
preserved. Instead, the Article advocates a simple solution: The
extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) should be based excusively on a
revised version of the conduct-effects test that ignores, in the case of
private actions, conduct in the United States that has no consequences in
this country.15
This Article will demonstrate that a revised approach to the conduct-
effects test fits squarely within the thrust of the Exchange Act.
Furthermore, when combined with an intelligent application of other
procedural and substantive rules, this revised approach would avoid the
overreach caused by the application of the conduct-effects test to foreign-
cubed class actions by limiting the application of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to violations that cause harm in the United States. At the same time,
the effect-only test that this Article advocates would not completely
eliminate all judicial discretion, because a modicum of flexibility should be
preserved. International disputes often defy bright-line rules and depend
heavily on the factual circumstances of a particular case. As will be
demonstrated below, a redefined "effect test" would also be in line with
general principles of international law and comity, as well as with existing
international agreements on jurisdiction to which the United States is not a
party.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I analyzes the status quo ante of
the Morrison decision. It begins with a brief explanation of the "fatal
attraction" of foreign plaintiffs to American courts in securities cases and
addresses why Rule 10b-5 claims have raised extremely delicate
extraterritorial application problems. It then outlines the statutory and
regulatory provisions that create the interpretative conundrum concerning
subject-matter jurisdiction in cases with international elements. Next, Part
I provides an overview of the development of the conduct and the effects
14. Id at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring) ('Imagine, for example, an American investor who buys
shares in a company listed only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American
subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New York City that the executives
masterminded and implemented a massive deception which artificially inflated the stock price - and
which will, upon its disclosure, cause the price to plummet. Or, imagine that those same executives
go knocking on doors in Manhattan and convince an unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material
misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company's doomed securities. Both of these
investors would, under the Court's new test, be barred from seeking relief under 5 10(b).'); see also
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should not "render the private cause of action under S 10(b) toothless').
15. My proposal is consistent with what appeared to be the original approach envisioned by the
Second Circuit in its 1968 landmark decision, Scboenbam v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968),
tr'd on rebeadng on othergeand, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tests. It also posits whether the dangers of the conduct-effects test have
been greatly exaggerated. Finally, Part I points out several rules applicable
to collective litigation that already limit the risks of expending resources on
foreign disputes.
Part II concentrates on the Morrison decision. After a brief description
of the case and the reasoning of the Supreme Court, this Part advances the
criticisms of Morrison's holding. It discusses the textual arguments that
buttressed the Court's conclusion and calls into question the consistency
of Monison with other areas of the law. More importantly, this Part shows
that the transactional test adopted by the majority is profoundly
ambiguous and might cause uncertainties in its application. Furthermore, if
the transactional test is interpreted narrowly enough to avoid uncertainties,
it will undermine the integrity of American securities markets.
Part III looks at future developments. It first discusses legislative
developments that followed the Monison decision, particularly the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, which might affect the regulation of international class
actions. Part III also spells out this Article's proposal to adopt a revised
effect test, illustrates the benefits of such an adoption, and expounds on
the need to conclude an international agreement on jurisdiction in
transnational securities litigation.
I. THE STATUS Quo ANTE: FROM WHENCE WE CAME
A. The 'FatalAttraction" of Foreign Investors (and Their Lauyers)forAmerican
Courts in Cases of Fraud
Securities class actions with an international dimension based on
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 raise the issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction and extraterritorial application of the securities
laws of the United States. Of course, there are other private causes of
action, express or implied, in the securities laws that are invoked by foreign
plaintiffs and are thus relevant to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in
transnational litigation. Prominent examples include causes of action under
Sections 11 and 12 of the Exchange Act, which concern the violation of
the registration requirements in a securities offering,16 and the implied
cause of action for false or misleading statements in connection with the
solicitation of a proxy (Rule 14a-9).17 In these cases, however, because
there is generally extensive contact with the United States, the question of
extraterritorial application does not come under scrutiny.18
16. The bibliography on these provisions is endless. For a concise but thorough overview, see
generally THOMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 271 (2009).
17. For an overview, see generally id. at 354-59.
18. A registration statement would not be necessary if the securities were not offered in the
[Vol. 52:405
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The broad reach of Rule 10b-5's "anti-fraud" provision encompasses
virtually any misstatement or fraudulent device employed in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security and is theoretically applicable to
transactions with limited contacts with the United States. 19 Additionally,
the private cause of action available under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is
implied. As with most creatures of judicial implication, this private cause
of action lacks the sharp boundaries that a legislature can draw. Therefore,
the question of its extraterritorial reach was left open.20 For these reasons,
the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in foreign-cubed class actions, on
which this Article focuses, developed primarily in the context of suits
based on Rule 10b-5. 21
But what makes American courts so attractive to foreign plaintiffs (or
their attorneys)?22 Both substantive and procedural reasons contribute to
this draw.23 Most features of the American legal landscape that make it
desirable to foreign litigants are well known and do not require extensive
discussion. First, the American class-action mechanism is uniquely fit for
disputes in which there are a multitude of investors with small individual
claims whose combined amount represents a substantial sum. 24 While
several other legal systems have recently introduced new types of collective
United States, and proxy solicitation rules only apply to corporations registered pursuant to the 1934
Act. See Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Reguladon S: Empirical Eidence on Offshore Securides
Offerings, 50 DuKE L.J. 663, 665 n.2 (2000).
19. 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (2011).
20. See id
21. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-80 (2010).
22. "As moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get
his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself, and at no risk of having
to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will conduct the case 'on spec' as we say, or on a
'contingency fee' as they say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for their services but instead
they will take 40 percent of the damages, if they win the case in court, or out of court on settlement."
J. Stanton Hill, Note, Towards Global Conenience, Fairness, and juddaEconomy: An Argument in Support of
Conditional ForuorNon Conveins Dismissals Before Determining Jurisdiction in United States Federal District
Courts, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1177, 1179 n.1 (2008), (quoting Smith Klie & French Lab. Ltd v.
Block, (1983) 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng.)).
23. Id. at 1179 n.2. A precise distinction between the former and the latter is not always easy.
Clearly, some "substantive" elements have "procedural" relevance. Consider, for example, the need
to plead the reliance requirement in order to state a claim and survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Reliance is required as an element of a Section 10(b) cause of action because it
"provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs
injury." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
24. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majoriy Voting Provirions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 423
(2003) (mentioning that "most other countries do not have procedural devices that are even remotely
similar to the U.S. class action"); Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Iigation in Germany and Switerlan4 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 369, 372 (2001) ("[qlass actions do not exist in Germany, Switzerland,
and most other countries of the civil law systen."). But f Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3)
Superionri Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: Exclud ngForsgn Class Members in Favr of European
Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 36-39 (2011) (exploring the mechanisms in Europe
for mass claims, including the Dutch Collective Settlement Act).
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remedies,25 these new procedural tools have yet to be well tested and
present significant differences from the American system - differences
that might undermine their suitability in the securities litigation context.
For example, the American opt-out system provides that individual
investors who do not want to be bound by the outcome of the class action
have to explicitly opt out after proper notice.26 Conversely, foreign
legislatures have generally adopted an opt-in system, in which only the
plaintiffs that actively join the collective litigation are bound by the
decision or settlement. 27 This difference in approach affects the dimension
of the putative class, which is much larger when small claimants must take
action to opt out, and reduces the value of the lawsuit in opt-in
jurisdictions. 28
Contingency fee arrangements, easily available in the United States for
business litigation, provide further fuel for this type of class action
litigation. 29 Compensation for adequate legal representation for a multitude
of investors who individually suffered relatively small losses must correlate
with the collective value of these claims. 30 Additionally, the absence of a
"loser pays" rule in the United States further encourages litigation.31
The discovery mechanism is another feature mostly unique to American
civil procedure. While "fishing expeditions" might raise concerns, the
25. See general Murtagh, supra note 24, at 36-39.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
27. A brief but complete comparative overview of class actions and collective remedies systems
around the world is offered by Sara Corradi et al., L'Agione Colletiva Ritanitori Profi Comparastini, 1
ANALISI GIURIDICA DELL'ECONOMIA 285, 299 (2008), who point out how the opt-out mechanism
has been adopted in the United States and considered in France, but has been rejected in favor of an
opt-in approach in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. This
important difference is also noted by Professor Miller in his work comparing U.S. and Italian class-
action mechanisms. Geoffrey P. Miller, Puni Canlie in Tema di Class Aeiown negi Stad Unidi e in Iaia,
1 ANALIsi GIuRICA DELL'ECONOMIA 211,224 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Corradi et al., supra note 27 (showing differences among countries).
29. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Doan a Manhole- The Coningeng Fee and its Discontents, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 474 (1998).
30. See general# Peter Karsten, Enabkng the Poor to Hae Their Day in Court. The Sandoning of
Contingeng Fee Contracts, A Histog to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998) (offering a historical
perspective on contingency fees). For a broader discussion of contingency fees, see Galanter, supra
note 29; Adam Shajnfeld, A Giical Snvy of the Law, Ethics and Economics of Attomy Contingent Fee
Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L REV. 773 (2009-2010). For a discussion of contingency fees in class
actions and securities litigation, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Clars Acdon Layers Make Too Litl?, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010). See also, e.g., Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651, 653 (D. Fla. 1992),
(holding that a reasonable compensation for attorneys with respect to a settlement in a securities case
would be approximately thirty percent of the gross settlement fund as fees); Shelley Thompson, The
Globaitadon of Secunties Markets: Effects on Imestor Protection, 41 INT'L LAW, 1121, 1131 n.68 (2007)
(reporting that contingency fees sought in securities litigation cases typically range between five
percent and thirty-five percent).
31. ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoIcS 408-10 (3d ed. 2000)
(evaluating the claim that the "loser pays all"approach causes less litigation than the American rule
requiring each party to pay his own litigation expenses).
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American discovery process provides a unique opportunity to create parity
of information between plaintiff and defendant, especially in situations in
which, as happens with securities litigation, defendants enjoy an
informational advantage over plaintiffs.32
Beyond these general features of U.S.-style litigation, specific elements
of a Rule 10b-5 claim also contribute to lure investor-plaintiffs to America.
All modern legal systems prohibit fraud in connection with securities
transactions, but systems' regulatory strategies and concrete provisions
vary significantly. For example, European systems are required by Article 6
of Directive 2003/71 to provide for specific statutory causes of actions for
misstatements and omissions in a prospectus used in a public offering of
securities.33 These provisions, which might be considered the European
equivalents of Sections 11 and 12 of the Exchange Act, apply only to
registered public offerings. Different member states have implemented this
vague European rule in radically different ways, with the consequence that
standards of legal protection tend to vary significantly across European
Union (EU) countries.34 Furthermore, in several civil law systems within
the EU, investors outside the public offer scenario are left to the
protection of general tort principles or to the doctrine of precontractual
32. The striking difference between U.S.-style discovery processes and the absence of similar
mechanisms in other legal cultures is vividly illustrated by the fact that compliance with discovery
orders abroad can violate local laws. See Laurent Martinet & Ozan Akyurek, The Perils of Taking
Dicovey to France, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2009, at 39, 40. For a discussion of discovery mechanisms
specific to the securities litigation context after the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, see
MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM ACT S 4 (2000); Tracy Bishop
Holton, Staing Causes ofAcfion for Securides Fraud Under the Private Securiies Utagaion Refom Act of 1995,
26 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 109 S 8 (2004); Jason M. Rosenthal, Staying Dicovey in Federal Secuuides
LAwsuits, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Nov. 2002, at 7.
33. In the relevant part, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 of Directive 2003/71 provide that:
1. Member States shall ensure that responsibility for the information given in a prospectus
attaches at least to the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies, the
offeror, the person asking for the admission to trading on a regulated market or the guarantor,
as the case may be. The persons responsible shall be clearly identified in the prospectus by
their names and functions or, in the case of legal persons, their names and registered offices, as
well as declarations by them that, to the best of their knowledge, the information contained in
the prospectus is in accordance with the facts and that the prospectus makes no omission
likely to affect its import.
2. Member States shall ensure that their laws, regulation and administrative provisions on civil
liability apply to those persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus.
Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 6 (EC). These provisions leave extreme latitude to
single Member States, and as a consequence, no really harmonized or uniform regulation of civil
liabilities for false or misleading prospectuses exists in Europe. It should also be noted that, when
compared with corresponding U.S. provisions, the above-mentioned rule is significantly lax and
clearly less protective of investors. For example, in contrast to section 11 of the Securities Act, there
is no strict liability for the issuer provided under European law. Id
34. For an analysis of the major approaches to the issue of prospectus liability in Europe, see
MARCO VENTORUZZO, LA RESPONSABILITA DA PROSPETTO NEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA TRA
REGOLE DEL MERCATO E MERCATO DELLE REGOLE, 207ff (2003).
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liability for the diffusion of false, misleading, or incomplete information.35
From the point of view of defrauded investors in the EU, these remedies
generally have less bite than Rule 10b-5. This is especially true because,
while the reliance element in a Rule 10b-5 action can be presumptively
satisfied in the United States under Ban, Inc. v. Levinson,36 many foreign
systems have explicitly rejected the "fraud-on-the-market" theory that
buttresses that presumption.37
Yet another attractive feature of Rule 10b-5 when compared with
similar remedies available abroad is the measure of damages. Rule 10b-5
does not regulate the amount of damages available to defrauded
investors.38 Damages are not confined to the "out-of-pocket" measure and
can include the disgorgement of defendants' profits, which is not allowed
in many foreign systems.39 Not only does this increase the availability of
damages to injured parties, but the mere possibility of these damages also
raises the settlement value of a lawsuit brought in the United States.40
Of course, the rules existing in different jurisdictions reflect legitimate
policy choices and do not necessarily imply a lower level of investor
protection. The regulatory approach of Continental states relies more on
ex ante administrative action rather than on ex post private litigation - a
strategy that can be as effective as the American approach.41 Assessing
35. Id
36. 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). As I will discuss, the question of whether the reliance presumption
also applies to investors that acquire securities on foreign markets is far from settled, but the mere
possibility of enjoying this inversion of the burden of proof can attract potential plaintiffs.
37. Recent scholarship has also considered the "fraud-on-the-global-market" theory. See Hannah
L. Buxbaum, Tranrnadonal Regastory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 262 (2006) (explaining the
"fraud on the global market" argument: "[E]ven if [plaintiffs] did not rely directly on the fraudulent
SEC filings ... , the statements in those filings would necessarily have affected the price of shares in
the foreign markets."); Julie B. Rubenstein, Note, Fraud on the Global Market: U.S. Courts Don't Buy It;
Subject-MatkrJuridiction in F-Cubed Securides Class Actions, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 627, 648-54 (2010).
However, this approach has been rejected by courts considering the argument in the context of
international securities litigation. See, e.g., In re AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F.Supp.2d 453, 465-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
38. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Secuides Fraud Class Aaions, 66
MD. L. REV. 348 (2007) (arguing for a limitation on the amount of damages recoverable to out-of-
pocket losses).
39. Id
40. See Robert B. Thompson, Simpfitiy and Certainy in the Measure of Recorary Under Rule 10b-5, 51
Bus. LAw. 1177, 1081-85 (1996).
41. This point is clearly stated in the brief for the Republic of France as amicus curiae in Morrison-
"France has its own reticulated regime of securities regulation and enforcement that rests on legal
traditions and policy judgments that are of fundamental importance to France, are shared with many
countries, and differ in important respects from those of the United States. Among the differences
are a greater role for government as opposed to private regulation and enforcement, as reflected in
the reliance on public actions (Partionpublique) rather than private class actions, and a concern with
the procedural fairness of certain forms of class action that purport to bind persons who have taken
no affirmative step to participate in the collective lawsuit (the opt-out class action)." Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at *1-2, Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd.
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these differences, however, is beyond the scope of this Article, which
focuses solely on underlining some of the procedural and substantive
reasons for the development in the United States of foreign-cubed
securities class actions based on Rule 10b-5. Interestingly enough, as this
Article discusses more analytically below, the very features of the
American system that attract foreign plaintiffs to the United States might
be - and often are - the grounds for dismissing their claims or for
excluding them from the putative class.42 The more profound and
significant the differences between the home jurisdiction and the United
States, the more a foreign plaintiff might find it attractive to sue in the
United States. These profound differences also reduce the deference that
the U.S. decision or settlement might receive abroad, thus negatively
affecting the likelihood of its enforcement and the scope of claim
preclusion. This possibility, in turn, affects the "superiority" requirement
of a class action that includes foreign plaintiffs, leading American judges to
exclude foreign claimants from the class altogether.43
B. A Statutog Conundrum: The Extrateritonal Reach of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act
A starting point for analyzing transnational securities litigation is to
understand that the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts and the
substantive coverage of Section 10(b) (and Rule 10b-5) are interrelated, if
not perfectly overlapping. The Exchange Act's jurisdictional provision
makes this explicit. Section 27 of the Act provides in relevant part that
U.S. courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations" of the Act and
the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to its authority.44 It follows
that, if conduct violates Section 10(b), federal courts have exclusive
adjudicative jurisdiction. Thus, for most practical purposes, the substantive
scope of the antifraud provision and the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction merge together. In the last forty years, federal courts
confronted with securities disputes with an international dimension have
first considered whether they held subject-matter jurisdiction.45 To answer
this question, these courts have examined the substantive scope of Rule
10b-5.46
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
42. See infa Part I.D.
43. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
44. 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (2006).
45. This conclusion is generally true any time federal jurisdiction is predicated on a federal
question. When the facts at issue are not regulated by federal law and fall outside the substantive
scope of the statute whose coverage is invoked, there is no subject-matter jurisdiction based on a
federal question. Of course, the inverse is not necessarily true: There might be subject-matter
jurisdiction, even where the specific facts at issue might not be covered by federal law.
46. Federal courts have subject-matter -jurisdiction in foreign-cubed class actions, but plaintiffs
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The Exchange Act is, however, laconic in its international reach, and
the scarcity of explicit indications has spurred controversy. Three basic
arguments based on the text of the Exchange Act have been used to
contend for or against its extraterritorial application. It should be noted
that none of these positions, which come down to arguments either for or
against the application of Rule 10b-5 to actions characterized by significant
foreign elements, has been held to be decisive.
First, the Exchange Act applies to "interstate commerce." 47 This
expression has traditionally been interpreted as including commerce with
foreign states. By including foreign states within the definition of interstate
commerce, it is possible to include foreign transactions within the scope of
the Exchange Act.
Second, Congress's silence on the extraterritorial application of Rule
10b-5 has been interpreted as an indication of the intention to either
include or exclude fraud with foreign elements. 48 The opposite meanings
attributed to this silence depend on different understandings of the
legislative history of the Exchange Act and Congress's awareness of the
international dimension of financial markets or its anticipation of more
recent international developments. 49
Finally, Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act has been used by
"reductionists" and "expansionists" to arrive at diametrically opposed
conclusions as to the extraterritorial applicability of Rule 10b-5. This
Section provides that the Exchange Act "shall not apply to any person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of
the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of
have no claim if the securities were not listed on an American exchange or if the transactions did not
occur in the United States. The Supreme Court held that these cases have to be dismissed under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim - and not Rule 12(b)(1) - lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873, 2876-77 (2010). I will come
back to this distinction later, but, as we will see, while it might have important procedural
consequences, it does not affect the substance of our analysis at this stage.
47. See 15 U.S.C. S 78)(b) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commene or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.") (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., John D. Kelly, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A PmposalforA New U.S. juriprmdence with
Regard to the Extrateritorial Appiation of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Secuntes Acts, 28
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 477, 491 (1997) (arguing that Congress's silence implies a refusal to apply
securities laws to transactions occurring outside the United States). But see Margaret V. Sachs, The
International Reach of Rule 106-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 681
(1990) (suggesting that the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions was left by
the legislature to the courts).
49. See Sachs, supra note 48, at 681.
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such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter."o Some courts and
commentators read this Rule as implying a general extraterritorial
application of the statute,51 while others read it as confirming that the
scope of the Rule excludes certain foreign transactions, with exceptions
arising where they are prohibited by the SEC.s 2 Because it does not offer a
clear definition of jurisdiction, Section 30(b) seems to say that the Act
applies both to activities within its jurisdiction and to activities that the
SEC deems it necessary to curtail in order to avoid evasion of the Act.
Reductionists have often supplemented their interpretations of the Act
with a reference, which was also invoked by the Supreme Court, to the
existence and scope of a general presumption against the extraterritorial
application of federal law.53 In truth, the Supreme Court has alternatively
embraced and rejected this presumption quite liberally throughout the last
decades. 54 Moreover, even assuming the validity of such a presumption,
the question of its scope remains a significant one, and the legislative
history of the Exchange Act may allow rebuttal of the presumption.
The bottom line of this Subsection is thus twofold. First, subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts in international securities class actions based
on Rule 10b-5 is a matter intertwined, if not identical, to the question of
the substantive scope of the Rule. Second, the text of the Exchange Act is
ambiguous with respect to its extraterritorial reach.
50. 15 U.S.C. S 78dd(b) (2006).
51. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), ne'd on othergroundr, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities. In our view, neither the usual presumption
against extraterritorial application of legislation nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show
Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks
traded in the United States which are effected outside the United States, when extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors.'; Symposium, Oversight by the U.S.
Secuities and Exchange Commirsion of U.S. Secenties Markets and Issues of Internationakation and
ExtraernitorialJarisdction, 29 INT'L LAW. 731, 737 (1995).
52. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882-83 (2010); Merritt B. Fox, The
Poitical Econovg of Statutoy Reach: U.S. Disclobae Rules in a Globaking Market for Secuities, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 696, 715 n.46 (1998) ("And while the legislative history dealing specifically with that phrase is
sparse and uninformative, S 30(b) of the Exchange Act sheds some light on Congress's desire to keep
the extraterritorial reach of the Exchange Act's regulation of the securities business to a minimum.").
53. Moniron, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
54. See James E. Ward, Comment, 'Ts That Your Final Answer?" The Patchwork jurisprudence
Suoundaing the Presumoption Against Extraknitoriaiy, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 717 (2002) (casting doubts
on the strength of the presumption that legislation, in the absence of an express option, should not
be applied to international disputes); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extratenitoriakiy, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L 85, 124 (1998) ("Congress's focus on domestic conditions
does not mean that its legislation should be applied only to conduct that occurs within the United
States. Rather it should be applied only to conduct that affects those conditions, regardless of where
that conduct occurs.").
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C. The Conduct-Effects Test: From Cradle to Coffin?
The conduct-effects test had been developed and applied in a long
series of precedents. For the purpose of illustrating the development of
the test, it is sufficient to focus on some leading cases. This Article will
simply offer a summary of the judicial trend before Morrison.
In 1968, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was
confronted with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,55 a case involving a derivative
action brought by an American shareholder against the directors of Banff,
a Canadian corporation whose shares were listed both in Canada and in
the United States. 56 The plaintiff claimed that the directors sold Banff
treasury stock to its controlling corporation (also a Canadian entity) at a
suboptimal price that did not take into account undisclosed information
on the mining activities of Banff. If this information had been taken into
account, or disclosed, it would have had a positive impact on the price of
the shares.57 The complaint argued that the transaction was deceptive and
in violation of Section 10(b), but the court dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim. The court held that there is no Section 10(b) deception when
independent directors, in possession of inside information, decide to sell
shares of a corporation, even if the consideration is grossly inadequate (the
conduct might, however, constitute a breach of the directors' fiduciary
duties).58
The relevant point of Schoenbaum, for purposes of this discussion, is that
the court affirmed that it held subject-matter jurisdiction.59 The litigation
involved American investors, plaintiffs suing derivatively on behalf of a
foreign corporation, for a transaction (the sale of treasury stock) occurring
outside the United States and between foreign parties. Notwithstanding
the limited contacts with the United States, jurisdiction was retained based
on the "effects" of the transaction in the United States.60 The court based
this effects analysis on the theory that alleged damages to Banff could have
indirectly affected the price of its shares listed in the United States.61 This
decision introduced the effect test into transnational securities litigation,
but the notion of "effects" was far from clearly defined.
The conduct test was introduced four years later in the equally famous
decision in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Cop. v. Maxwell62 In Leasco, the
55. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rvw'don othergrounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
56. Id at 204.
57. Id at 205.
58. Id at 204.
59. Id
60. Id at 208-09. See also supra note 51.
61. Id ("A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving it of fair compensation for
the issuance of its stock would necessarily have the effect of reducing the equity of the corporation's
shareholders and this reduction in equity would be reflected in lower prices bid for the shares.").
62. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cit. 1972).
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wholly-owned subsidiary, incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles, of an
American corporation was allegedly induced by a British citizen through
fraudulent statements to buy the shares of a British corporation listed on
the London Stock Exchange. 63 While the securities transaction occurred in
the United Kingdom, a significant part of the deceptive conduct occurred
in the United States.64 The defendants met several times in New York with
officers and board members of the plaintiff corporation, and false and
misleading documents were sent to the United States.65
The court focused on the fact that extensive fraudulent acts were
performed in the United States and concluded that the federal courts had
jurisdiction based on that conduct.66 Chief Judge Friendly, however,
writing the opinion of the court, carefully noted that limited conduct in the
United States might not be enough to establish adjudicative jurisdiction.67
In particular, he distinguished the situation in Leasco from a hypothetical
case in which two foreigners meet in the United States and, during this
meeting, one deceives the other, causing her to purchase shares abroad.68
Chief Judge Friendly observed that in this second scenario, U.S. courts
would not have jurisdiction.69 The decision seemed to suggest that damage
to an American investor is an essential element to consider before
establishing jurisdiction. Interestingly enough, this case arguably could
have found subject-matter jurisdiction under the effect test because the
alleged violation of Section 10(b) also caused effects in the United States.
One of the victims of the damage caused by the fraud was an American
investor, Leasco, who was the single shareholder of Leasco N.V., the
foreign subsidiary that purchased the shares. 70 The court, in applying a
''conduct test' rather than an "effects test," most likely considered these
effects to be too indirect and speculative to serve as grounds for subject-
matter jurisdiction.
Subsequent decisions have moved away from the Leasco approach of
simply concentrating on whether any conduct had taken place in the
United States. Bersch v. Drexel7' decided by the Second Circuit in 1975, was
a meaningful step in that direction. Dealing with a complex offering of
securities that involved significant foreign elements, the court spelled out
two bases for the application of the U.S. securities laws. Section 10(b)
would apply: (a) to sales to American citizens in the United States,
63. Id at 1330.
64. Id. at 1330-33.
65. Id at 1332.
66. Id at 1334, 1339.
67. Id at 1337.
68. Id at 1338.
69. Id
70. Id
71. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 2010).
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independent of the occurrence of acts in the United States; and (b) to sales
to American citizens abroad, if significant acts that contributed to the loss
occurred in the United States.72 The court added that federal law would
not apply to sales to foreigners outside the United States if acts in this
country did not cause the loss.73 In its totality, then, this decision is
interpreted as extending federal jurisdiction only to situations in which
there was relevant conduct that occurred in the United States.
Since Bersch, the conduct test has taken a variety of forms. The circuits
have taken diverging roads with respect to "the degree to which the
American-based conduct must be related causally to the fraud and the
resultant harm to justify the application of American securities law." 74 A
1998 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Kautbar v. Sternberg,75 effectively
summarizes the major differences. The District of Columbia Circuit took
the narrowest approach, arguing that, in order to establish jurisdiction,
domestic conduct must be present in all the elements of the cause of
action.76 The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adopted a broader test,
asserting jurisdiction more aggressively. In these circuits, some conduct
occurring in the United States in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme was
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.77 The Second Circuit struck the middle
ground between these two extremes, requiring "substantial' acts in
furtherance of the fraud to be committed in the United States.78 Moreover,
even within these general distinctions, additional inconsistencies could be
found. In particular, the Second Circuit's standard of "substantial" acts in
furtherance of the fraud eluded a clear-cut definition.79
To further complicate the matter, an additional decision in the mid-
1990s commingled the effects and conduct tests, holding that, in
determining federal jurisdiction, the tests did not need to be satisfied
separately and distinctly, but could be combined. In Itoba v. Lep Group,so
the Second Circuit observed that there are no separate minimum degrees
of "effects" or "conduct" that needed to be met to affirm jurisdiction;
effects and conduct could be seen as communicating vessels, in which
conduct and effects mingle to reach the required minimum contact with
72. Id at 993.
73. Id.
74. Kauthar SBN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1998).
75. Id (discussing the differences among the circuits).
76. Zoelsch v. Anderson, 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77. See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983); Cont'1 Grain (Austl.)
Pry. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114
(3d Cir. 1977).
78. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton, 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
79. Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010) (noting the difficulty in
applying the resulting "conduct test").
80. 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
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the United States.81 This approach opened the door for a broad expansion
of the reach of the securities laws. Even if Itoba was later distinguished by a
significant number of subsequent cases and thus had a limited impact,82 it
still contributed to confounding the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction.
As if the existing jurisprudence were not already complicated enough, a
third approach was embraced by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States of 1987.83 Two provisions of the
Restatement are relevant: Sections 416(1) and 416(2). While Section 416(1)
spells out criteria fairly similar to the ones considered by the conduct and
effect tests, Section 416(2) contains a reference to a reasonableness
standard, based on the notion of comity, as a ground for retaining
jurisdiction.84 Pre-Morrison case law was far from clear, and some decisions
seemed to stretch the coverage of the securities laws to disputes in which
the United States had little interest. Under the effects test, the concept of
what amounted to effects that would trigger jurisdiction in the United
States was elusive - whether a potential effect on the price of securities
issued by an American entity or listed on an American exchange was
sufficient, for example, was not always clear. The sliding scales for
extraterritorial application later derived in the conduct test did little to
resolve the subject-matter jurisdiction question; inconsistencies among the
different circuits (and, occasionally, within a single circuit) due to the
unique, fact-intensive nature of securities fraud inquiries.85 Combining the
two tests, as Itoba did, only amplified the uncertainties that accompanied
each test. Finally, the balancing test adopted by the Restatement, which has
received limited judicial application, also presented relevant uncertainties.
81. Id at 122.
82. For cases distinguishing Itoba, see, for example, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 526,
531 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (D. Del. 2006); Burke
v. China Aviation Oil (Sing.) Corp., 421 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Alstom SA, 406
F. Supp. 2d 346, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Euro Trade & Forfaiting, Inc. v. Vowell, No. 00 CV 8431,
2002 WIL 500672, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002); In m Cable & Wireless, PLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d 749,
764 (E.D. Va. 2004); In av Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000); McNamara v.
Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
83. For a description of this approach, see D.C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revidted* Umidag the
Scope of Ankifraud Protecton in an Internationahied Securities Markeplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
241, 248 (1992); Corrado Malberti, Lx <Interadonal Securides Litigadons> Nel Diritto Degli Stad Unid
D'America, 28 BANcA IMPRESA SOcIETA 125, 144 (2009).
84. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law S 416 (1987).
85. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-80 (2010).
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D. Is the 'Dangerous Extratenitoriakoy" of U.S. Securides Laws Really So
Dangerous?86
The Supreme Court explicitly abrogated almost all the cases mentioned
above, and several others, in 2010 with the Morrison decision.87 This
abrogation raises two issues. The first question is whether, notwithstanding
the undeniable problems accompanying the conduct-effects test, the
existing doctrines really posed a significant threat in terms of excessive
extension of American jurisprudence that was in conflict with the
sovereignty of other jurisdictions. The second question is whether there
actually was a strain on American courts that were called on to resolve
primarily foreign disputes. A negative answer to both questions would not
be, in itself, a strong argument in favor of the conduct-effects test. The
answers are relevant not only to put the alleged problems in perspective,
but also to assess the superiority of the new "transactional test" envisioned
by Mormison in comparison with the conduct-effects test and the alternative
solution suggested in this Article.
Empirical evidence is a good place to start in assessing the claim that
the conduct-effects test, as it existed prior to Morrison, resulted in the
excessive and onerous exercise of American jurisdiction in securities cases
with international elements. A recent study shows that from 2005 to 2009,
the number of securities class action lawsuits filed against a foreign
corporation (including but not limited to foreign-cubed actions) amounted
to between 11.2% and 17.1% of the total number of securities class actions
filed.88 The proportion of actions against foreign defendants tended to
increase slightly more in the years in which the overall number of securities
class actions was higher. In 2008, for example, there were 210 federal class
actions involving securities litigation and 17.1% of these actions were
brought against foreign defendants. By contrast, in 2006 and 2009, when
110 and 155 class actions were filed respectively, the percentage of cases
involving a foreign defendant was 12.7% and 12.9%, respectively.89
It is difficult to draw any particular conclusion from this scant empirical
evidence. Two observations seem fair. First, the relative stability of the
number of federal lawsuits involving foreign defendants, in proportion to
the total number of securities class actions brought annually, suggests that
there has not been - at least in the five years considered - a
86. Seegeneraly Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extrateitoialiy ofAmerian
Secuntier Law, 17 NW. J. INT'L. L & BUS. 207 (1996) (suggesting that extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws should be limited to protect investors).
87. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-81 (2010).
88. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 SEcURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 6, 35, available at
http://tinyurl.com/yaznmhs (listing the number of total U.S. federal securities class action lawsuits
and the total number of those lawsuits that were filed against foreign companies).
89. Id
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disproportionate increase in foreign-based litigation. Instead, the number
of actions brought against foreign corporations appears to be more of a
function of variables common to securities class actions generally, such as
market trends, rather than the consequence of an excessive opening of
federal courts to foreign plaintiffs through an irresponsible use of the
conduct-effects test.
Second, in absolute terms, it does not seem that, even under the
conduct-effects test, the scarce resources of the federal judiciary were
particularly burdened by securities cases with no connection to the United
States. Between 2005 and 2009, the average annual number of federal
securities class actions with a foreign defendant was twenty-three. 90 On
average, this corresponds to approximately 14% of all securities class
actions.91 However, even in actions with a foreign defendant, most
involved at least some plaintiffs who were American investors. Of the
remaining cases that involved no American plaintiff, only a small number
of these cases could be considered pure foreign-cubed class actions. 92 Of
course, it may be argued that, while the available data do not suggest an
alarming situation, it might be that these latter cases were particularly
complex and thus put a heavy burden on the caseload of federal courts.
In addition to the two observations derived from available empirical
evidence, theoretically not every case that satisfies the jurisdictional
requirement under the conduct-effects test would result in a prolonged
expenditure of judicial resources on predominantly foreign disputes. To
assert subject-matter jurisdiction does not automatically transform our
judicial system into a Shangri-La for foreign plaintiffs and the plaintiffs'
bar. Securities class actions based on Rule 10b-5 face several additional
hurdles that a foreign plaintiff must overcome. Courts can thus apply
intelligent and well-advised judicial discretion in using these rules in order
to curb frivolous litigation and prevent the misuse (or abuse) of American
courts by foreign plaintiffs and their attorneys. Three of the most relevant
and powerful devices that can be used, and that have been used to this
effect, are class certification, pleading standards (particularly with respect
to the reliance requirement), and theforum non conveniens doctrine.
1. Class Certificadon
Subject-matter jurisdiction is not the only obstacle that the foreign
plaintiff must overcome to bring a securities lawsuit in a U.S. court.
90. Id
91. From 2005 to 2009, a total of 807 federal securities class action lawsuits were filed with 116
of those suits involving a foreign defendant. Id.
92. Id at 44 (noting the few significant F-cubed cases).
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Another crucial question is class certification.93 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a), a class must meet the following requirements to be certified: the
class must be numerous enough so that a joinder of all parties would not
be an adequate instrument for the collective litigation, there must be
factual and legal elements common to the each member of the class, the
class representative must have a "typical" claim based on the conduct and
legal arguments applicable to the rest of the class, and the class
representative must "adequately" represent the class.94 It is not necessary,
in this Article, to analyze each element set forth by Rule 23(a). Rather, it is
sufficient to say that the heterogeneity that often characterizes the
positions of the putative members of an international class might clash
with the above-mentioned requirements.
More relevant to this Article are the requirements for class certification
established by Rule 23(b), particularly Rule 23(b)(3), the so-called
"superiority" requirement. The superiority requirement is a flexible
standard that requires the court to examine whether a class action is the
most appropriate judicial instrument for dispute resolution, especially in
the case of foreign plaintiffs.95 It is a powerful device against the
proliferation of transnational class actions, especially if there are significant
differences between the substantive laws of the United States and those of
the other legal systems involved.96 In other words, the lower the likelihood
of the recognition or enforcement of an American judgment or settlement
abroad, the higher the likelihood that a U.S. court will not expand the class
to include the foreign plaintiffs.
To determine whether the superiority requirement is satisfied, courts
must engage in a case-by-case analysis of the possible effects of the
litigation in other systems, relying heavily on expert testimony. If the
inquiry suggests that the American decision may not be recognized as final
in other jurisdictions, and that some investors might get a second bite at
the same apple by suing again in a foreign jurisdiction, these investors are
likely to be kept out of the class. 97 More specifically, courts have devised a
93. See Brian P. Murray & Maurice Pesso, The Aaident of Effiiency: Foreign Exchanges, Asserican
Depository Recepts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFFALO L. REV. 383, 388-89 (2003) (discussing the issue of
class certification in the context of the fraud on the market presumption); see also Erez Reuveni,
Extrartoniaky as Standing: A Standng Theory of the Extratenitorial Appraton of the Secuites Lws, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2010) (mentioning how the nature of global financial markets raises
class certification concerns).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
95. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
96. Recent scholarship has advocated adopting such an approach in light of the growing number
of jurisdictions that have mechanisms for resolving these mass claims, particularly in Europe. See
Murtagh, supra note 24, at 36-43 (detailing the mechanisms in Europe and arguing that European
plaintiffs, in particular, should be excluded from such class actions in the United States).
97. FED. R.. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (delineating particular factors for courts to consider). See general
Murtagh, supra note 24, at 16-43 (providing a host of concerns to consider if foreign plaintiffs were
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"near certainty" test under which foreign investors are not included in the
class if there is a significant likelihood that they might also sue in a foreign
jurisdiction that would not recognize the outcome of an American-style
class action.98 In re Vivendi UniversaP9 is a good example of application of
the superiority requirement. In this case, German and Austrian investors
were not included in the class action, while Dutch and French investors
were allowed to proceed with litigation in the American forum.'00
2. Reliance and the 'Fraud on the Global Market" Theory
American investors suing under Rule 10b-5 generally do not need to
prove reliance on the alleged misstatements of the defendants in order to
have a cause of action, because the Supreme Court decision in Basic allows
for a presumption of reliance. 101 The basis for this presumption is the
assumption that markets are efficient and therefore reflect all publicly
available information.10 2 Because a defendant's misstatement alters the
integrity of the market price of its securities by fraudulently affecting
available public information, securities transactions based on reliance on
market prices are functionally equivalent to transactions relying directly on
fraudulent statements. For example, a misstatement could lead to an
artificial inflation of the price of a security, which would in turn damage
investors who paid more than the proper market value or price of the
security because they believed that the price they paid reflected the real
value of the security.103
This presumption, known as the "fraud-on-the-market" doctrine, 0 4 is
rebuttable by the defendant, but represents formidable protection of
included in American class action lawsuits in federal court).
98. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 ("[W]hile an American court need not
abstain from entering judgment simply because of a possibility that a foreign court may not recognize
or enforce it, the case stands differently when this is a near trainty.'" (emphasis added).
99. 381 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
101. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) ("The presumption of reliance employed in
this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional
policy embodied in the 1934 Act").
102. Id at 246-47.
103. See Merritt B. Fox, Causaion in Fraud-on-the-Market Alions, in PERSPECrTIVES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 235, 237 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010). See also Merritt
B. Fox, Regulaton FD and Foregn Issuers: Globataton's Strins and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT'LL. 653,
687-88 (2001) ("The underlying logic of the fraud on the market doctrine is that the purchasers have
been made unfairly worse off by the false statement and thus deserve compensation.").
104. The Third Circuit provides a clear explanation of this doctrine. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its business.... Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements ... . The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase
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investors in the litigation setting. Actual proof of reliance, which might
require a single plaintiff to offer evidence that she actually read or heard
the misleading statements and invested on that basis, can be extremely
difficult, particularly in anonymous markets. Additionally, the presumption
is not only important from a substantive point of view, but is also often
regarded as an essential element in enabling the establishment of a class
action. If each member of the class were required to demonstrate actual
reliance, it is likely that the class would not be certified, or that only a small
number of investors could compose the class, thus making collective
litigation untenable. The presumption that all investors included in the
putative class relied on the integrity of the market price is essential for the
creation of the class.105
An interesting and delicate question posited by transnational securities
litigation is whether the fraud-on-the-market theory can also apply to the
purchase or sale of securities in foreign markets. In other words, do
investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange need to provide
positive proof of reliance on the defendants' misstatements, or can they
also rely on the presumption available to American investors?
The answer that federal courts have systematically given to this question
is that the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply to transactions in
foreign markets.106 Even when an issuer has the same class of securities
listed both abroad and in the United States, and a link can be established
between the prices of the securities on the different markets, courts have
refused to extend the rationale of Basic to foreign-cubed class actions and,
more generally, to transactions occurring abroad.107 With the fraud-on-the-
market theory unavailable to them, the inability of foreign plaintiffs to
prove reliance on the misstatements might lead to the dismissal of the case
for both lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim,
since reliance is one of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 action. This judicial
position, sometimes described as the refusal of the "fraud-on-the-global-
market" theory, thus contributes to reducing the risk of overburdening
American courts with disputes in which the United States has little interest.
One of the leading and most recent decisions of the Southern District
of New York deals with the fraud-on-the-global-market theory. In re
AstraZeneca Securides Ligation offers an illustration of how the refusal to
recognize this theory can be the basis for denying subject-matter
of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.").
105. See Merritt B. Fox, Causadon in Fraud-on-the-Market Acions, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 235,237 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010).
106. On this basis, courts have also denied subject matter jurisdiction. See In nr AstraZeneca Sec.
Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 453, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Inn The Bain Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25
(D.D.C. 2000). A convincing defense of the "fraud-on-the-global-market" argument is offered by
Julie B. Rubenstein. See supra note 37, at 651-54.
107. Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 648-51.
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jurisdiction. 08 In AstraZeneca, the defendant was a British corporation with
shares listed on the NYSE, London Stock Exchange, and Stockholm
Exchange.109 The defendant had allegedly disseminated false information
concerning the safety of one of its products, an anticoagulant medicine." 0
To establish jurisdiction under the conduct prong of the conduct-effects
test, the foreign plaintiffs who acquired stock abroad had to demonstrate
that conduct beyond mere preparation for the commission of fraud had
occurred in the United States and that this conduct directly caused the
plaintiffs' losses that resulted from their reliance on the misstatements.
The foreign plaintiffs tried to satisfy this second condition by invoking the
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory to purchases in foreign
exchanges, but the court rejected this argument.111
Interestingly enough, the district court did not refute the validity of the
fraud-on-the-global-market theory in general. The court argued that the
theory might hold true, but still dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
observing that allowing the foreign plaintiffs to plead reliance in this way
would improperly and excessively broaden the reach of U.S. securities
laws.112
Although the AstraZeneca court declined to assess the fraud-on-the
global-market theory, the availability of this argument to foreign plaintiffs
remains controversial.113 For example, whereas the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York seems at least willing to consider the
validity of the theory, one of the amicus curiae briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court in Mormison by students of the Yale Law School Capital
Markets and Financial Instruments Clinic strongly argued that the foreign
investors' claim in that case should have been dismissed under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) because the presumption of reliance on market prices is not
available to foreign investors. 114 The presumption, the amici argued, is
inapplicable in light of existing empirical evidence on the nature of the
interrelated behavior of securities markets in different jurisdictions. 115 In
taking this position, the amici claimed that differences in market price
reactions of the same security listed on different exchanges generally
undermine the efficiency hypothesis on which the fraud-on-the-market
108. In re AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
109. Id at 464.
110. Id at 457.
111. Id at 465-66.
112. Id. at 466.
113. See Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 648-54.
114. Brief of Anici Curiae, Professors and Students of the Yale Law School Capital Markets and
Financial Instruments Clinic, in Support of Respondents at 3, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130
S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
115. Id. at 16 (noting that ADR prices take longer than a day to "fully integrate shocks to the
prices of foreign underlying shares").
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theory is based. 116 Proponents of the fraud-on-the-global market theory,
meanwhile, argue that the amici's position here is based on a
misconception of the fraud-on-the-market theory. 117
Whether this theory is generally accepted is not crucial to the current
discussion. The key point is that federal courts have adopted a rigorous
standard for establishing the element of reliance in foreign-cubed Rule
10b-5 lawsuits. As a result, foreigners who transacted on a foreign
exchange must demonstrate actual reliance on a fraudulent or misstated
fact; they do not benefit from the presumed reliance standard, predicated
on the fraud-on-the-market theory, to which U.S. plaintiffs may look. The
consequence of this is that the claims of foreign investors can often
immediately be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure
to state a claim. Moreover, even if foreign investors survive these motions,
they might be left out of the class on class certification grounds, such as
for failure to meet the commonality requirement.
3. Forum Non Conveniens
Notwithstanding the ancient echoes of its Latin name, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is relatively new. The doctrine was born in English and
Scottish courts in the nineteenth century and was largely developed in
admiralty cases. 118 At its core, the doctrine states that, independent from
the issue of jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case if it appears that an
alternative forum is more convenient to all parties involved.119
116. Id at 16-17.
117. Proponents of the fraud-on-the-global-market theory argue that the fraud-on-the-market
theory should be extended to a global context because the latter doctrine does not necessarily require
information efficiency in financial markets. According to Baic, it is sufficient that market prices
reflect incorrect information to invoke the presumption of reliance; it is not necessary for the market
reaction to be immediate or even particularly quick. As long as the integrity of market prices is
tainted by untrue or misleading information, investors do not need to demonstrate that they relied
diret on the information to establish their cause of action. Clearly enough, then, the Basic test is
satisfied even if the effect of the false information on the market is delayed one day after the
information becomes public, as long as investors bought or sold securities based on altered prices.
For example, investors buying on the Tokyo stock exchange can state a claim under Basic, even
though misleading information disclosed in the United States will only be reflected in Tokyo shares'
prices after a time lag. Moreover, even if this interpretation of Basic is rejected, empirical evidence
used by opponents of the fraud-on-the-global-market theory as to the information efficiency in U.S.
markets as compared to other foreign exchanges on which the same securities are listed is scant and
not particularly convincing. Id. at 15-17. In fact, assuming that there is an inherently superior
information efficiency only in U.S. markets runs counter to the fact that information travels quite
rapidly between globally connected financial markets. See also Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 651-54.
118. Hill, supra note 22, at 1182-83 & n.23.
119. Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,425,429 (2007);
Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Form Non Con'eniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1929).
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In the United States, the doctrine was described in a seminal 1929
article by Paxton Blair120 and reached the Supreme Court for the first time
in 1947 in the leading case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.121 In that decision,
the Court established a balancing test, based on public and private interest
factors, that a court should consider in order to dismiss a case on the
grounds offorum non conveniens.122
Forum non conveniens analysis remained important in transnational
litigation and reached the Supreme Court again in 1981 in Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno,123 which fairly settled the general parameters of the doctrine in
cases involving foreign parties. Reyno found that, if there is a foreign forum
that could adjudicate the dispute, a U.S. court can dismiss a case following
a cost-benefit analysis of litigation in the United States compared to the
foreign forum.124
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerningforum non conveniens
further established the parameters of this doctrine by affirming that
dismissal for forum non conveniens can be decided independently of the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. 125 This is particularly relevant in
the context of foreign-cubed securities cases asserted under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Consider, for example, a typical foreign-cubed action
based on Rule 10b-5, in which Italian investors buy shares of a Swiss
corporation on the London Stock Exchange. Even if part of the allegedly
illegal conduct occurred in the United States and, in theory, subject-matter
120. Blair, supra note 119, at 21. On the topic offocmm non coneniens, see generally David W. Feder,
The Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal in the Absence of Subject-Matter Jundistion, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
3147 (2006); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conweniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applyng Foreign
Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161 (2005); Finity E. Jernigan, Formm Non
Commiens: Whose Convenience and Jused?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
121. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The case involved a Virginia citizen, Gilbert, who brought an action in
a federal district court in New York City against a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified to do business
in both Virginia and New York, to recover damages for destruction of the plaintiff's public
warehouse and its contents in Virginia by a fire resulting from the defendant's negligence. Id. at 502-
03. The Court ruled that, although the Court had jurisdiction and the venue was correct, all events in
litigation had taken place in Virginia, most of the witnesses resided there, and both state and federal
courts in Virginia were available to the plaintiff and were able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.
Id at 511-12. The Court dismissed the suit based on the doctrine offomom non conveniens. Id. at 512.
122. Id at 508 ("Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance
of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.').
123. 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing the case in favor of Scottish jurisdiction because the victims
were Scottish).
124. Id at 255-61 (finding the district court's analysis of the factors to be reasonable and thus,
did not warrant reversal by the Court of Appeals).
125. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) ("A
district court therefore may dispose of an action by a forum non coneniens dismissal, bypassing
questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness,
and judicial economy so warrant.").
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jurisdiction could be established under the conduct-effects test, it is more
likely than not that the case would be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds.12
6
The analysis courts undertake in forum non conveniens considerations is
quite cursory.127 It is generally sufficient for the party requesting dismissal
to demonstrate that the issue can be litigated in an alternative, foreign
forum. Disputes as to the effect of applicable substantive laws and to the
likelihood that the plaintiff will obtain a remedy in the alternative forum
are usually not relevant. 128 Moreover, the Supreme Court shows great
deference to district courts' discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a
case on the basis of forum non conveniens. This approach has raised
criticism, 129 but this Article does not take a position in this debate. Rather,
this Article aims to demonstrate that the forum non conveniens doctrine
represents yet another powerful and flexible tool that federal courts can
use to avoid adjudicating foreign-cubed securities class actions that present
little connection to the United States.
Foreign plaintiffs can always attempt to engage in forum shopping in
the United States. In order to prevent the federal judiciary from becoming
the Shangri-La of aggressive litigants and their attorneys, American courts
must have judicial resources to combat and curb abusive behaviors in
cases that present limited connections to this country without undermining
their own adjudicative jurisdiction in securities disputes. Class certification
requirements, the actual reliance element in Rule 10b-5 actions, and the
forum non conveniens doctrine are such resources that have successfully
limited the availability of U.S. courts to foreign investors. With these
additional protections at hand, the use of the conduct-effects test may not
be as dangerous as its opponents claim.
II. MORRISON V. NATIONALAUSTRALIA BANK
In Part I, this Article examined some of the existing legal hurdles that
reduced the risk of proliferation of foreign-cubed securities litigation in the
United States. Class certification, pleading standards for reliance, and the
forum non conveniens doctrine represent serious barriers for foreign investors
who intend to access the American judicial system. A reasonable and
126. See, e.g., Pfizer v. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2009) (suggesting that form non
coneniens was an alternative ground to dismissing the case for failure to state a claim).
127. Seegeneral4Jernigan, supra note 120 (arguing that the level of deference accorded infoam non
coneniens issues is too lax). Contra Pfizer v. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2009).
128. For example, in Psper Ainraf, the Court considered and rejected the argument that
dismissing the case would subject the plaintiff to a forum where the law was less favorable to the
plaintiff because such a decision was "inconsistent with the purpose of the form non coeniens
doctrine." 454 U.S. at 247-52.
129. See generalJernigan, supra note 120 (discussing criticism).
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intelligent use of these rules can resolve most, if not all, of the criticisms
raised by those who argue against the application of U.S. securities laws to
claims with foreign elements. One advantage of relying on these rules to
dismiss cases where U.S. interests are minimal is their lack of hindrance of
the scope of U.S. courts' adjudicative jurisdiction in other situations.
The Supreme Court took a different view in Morrison and abandoned
the traditional conduct-effects test in determining subject-matter
jurisdiction. Instead, the Court ruled in favor of a much narrower (and, as
will be argued, equally uncertain) "transactional" test. The following will
take a closer look at the Morrison decision and argue that the bases for the
Supreme Court's holding are contestable.
A. The Decision
National Australia Bank (NAB) is one of the largest Australian financial
institutions. 130 The bank's common stock (ordinary shares) is listed on the
stock exchanges of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and London. American
Depository Receipts (ADRs) representing NAB's common stock are listed
on the NYSE.131 In 1998, NAB acquired HomeSide Lending, a mortgage
service provider based in Florida.132 In 2001, NAB announced significant
write-downs affecting the value of HomeSide Lending, arguably due to
improper accounting practices of the controlled company, which resulted
in a material drop in the price of the shares and ADRs of NAB.133
Litigation ensued wherein three plaintiffs sought to represent a class of
non-American purchasers of NAB's shares, while one plaintiff, Morrison,
sought to represent American investors who bought ADRs. These parties
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, alleging a violation of Rule 10b-5.134
Applying the conduct-effects test, the district court held that the foreign
plaintiffs lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).135 The court also dismissed the claim of the
domestic plaintiffs under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted by not having alleged damages caused by the
fraud.136 Only the foreign plaintiffs chose to appeal.
130. Scott Murdoch, Bg FourAustrakaun Banks have joined the Global Ete, THE AUSTRALIAN (Jan.
26, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://tinyurl.com/7a9woa4.
131. In te Nat'1 Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-CV-6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 2006).
132. Id at *1.
133. Id at *2.
134. Id
135. Id at *4-5.
136. Id at *9.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal after a
lengthy discussion of the conduct-effects test.137 The court focused on the
conduct of the defendants and held that the allegedly fraudulent activities
showed stronger and more relevant contacts with Australia.138 Digging
into the particular facts of the case is beside the point and beyond the
scope of this Article. What is worth mentioning is that the court's
consideration of "declining jurisdiction over all 'foreign-cubed' securities
fraud actions would conflict with the goal of preventing the export of
fraud from America."' 39 The court concluded that the conduct test
properly balances the goal of preventing the export of fraud with the
conflicting goal of limiting the use of American courts to disputes in which
a significant American interest is at stake.140 It wisely observed that in this
area, "rigid bright-line rules. . . cannot anticipate all the circumstances in
which the ingenuity of those inclined to violate the securities laws should
result in their being subject to American jurisdiction."141
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and used the opportunity to close
the book on over forty years of case law. Procedurally, the Court framed
the question of the admissibility of foreign-cubed class actions not as a
jurisdictional issue, but as a merits question. The Court stated that the
district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and
that the question at issue in the case revolved around the substantive reach
of Section 10(b).142 Consequently, the Court held that the question of
jurisdiction concerning the foreign plaintiffs should be addressed as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and not
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).14 3 As the Court
recognized, this characterization of the question at hand does not alter the
analysis and the practical result of the Court's decision.144 This Article
concentrates on the Court's interpretation of the substantive scope of Rule
10b-5.
B. The Presumption Against Extratemtonaipy
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, buttressed the rejection of the
conduct-effects test by pointing to the so-called "presumption against
extraterritoriality." 145 According to this principle, federal statutes are
137. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
138. Id at 176.
139. Id at 175.
140. Id
141. Id
142. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,2873 (2010).
143. Id at 2873, 2876-77.
144. Id at 2877.
145. Id at 2882-83.
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intended to apply only within U.S. territory, unless this presumed inward-
looking attitude of the legislature can be rebutted by contrary evidence. 146
The problem with this principle is that it is more a myth than a reality in
American law. Even a cursory review of decisions suggests that its
foundations are shaky. The scope and very existence of a similar
presumption oscillated within the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
itself and has received extensive scholarly critique.147 In the last century,
the judicial pendulum of the Supreme Court swung several times in
different directions. From American Banana v. United Fruit Co.14 8 to Hariford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California,149 the Court moved between accepting the
presumption and holding the presumption inapplicable. Looking further to
the analysis of lower courts' decisions, the confusion seems to increase.150
As one author has described, "Supreme Court and lower court cases reveal
that there is no coherent canon of construction being applied to
ambiguous statutes. Instead, the presumption [against extraterritoriality]
requires courts to piece together scant evidence of congressional intent
and gap-filling in a manner consistent only with the outdated bases for the
presumption."15 1
With this premise, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a rather
weak basis for limiting the scope of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Moreover, a fairly large number of decisions that embraced the
presumption against extraterritoriality agree that the presumption could be
overcome by the presence of effects of relevant conduct in the United
States. Examples of this line of thought are found, for example, in United
146. Id. at 2877-78.
147. Without clear evidence of congressional intent, the presumption is to bar the application of
U.S. federal statutes abroad. However, this presumption has no force when a statute, on its face,
relates to foreign affairs. A presumption in favor of extraterritoriality in those cases allows the
judiciary to avoid assumptions and misinterpretations regarding congressional intent. The
presumption against extraterritoriality, as currently applied, on the other hand, does not afford the
judiciary the same benefit when adjudicating extraterritorial disputes. See general William S. Dodge,
Extrakrritoriaky and Conflct-of-Law Theoy: An ArgumentforJudicial Uniateraism, 39 HARV. INT'L LJ.
101 (1998) (suggesting a change in approach in the application of laws extraterritorially); Ward, supra
note 54 (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality by lower U.S. courts).
148. 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909) ("[The general and almost universal rule is that the character of
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according
to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations,
which the other state concerned justly might resent.... The foregoing considerations would lead, in
case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect
to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.").
149. 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993) ("Although the proposition was perhaps not always free from
doubt, it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant
to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.").
150. See Ward, supra note 54, at 729.
151. Id at 750.
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States v. Alcoa 52 Sale v. Haitian Centers Counal, Inc.,153 and Harford Fir.154
Regarding the Exchange Act, Judge Bork, in another seminal case, Zoelsch
v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,1 55 similarly noted that "Congress was concerned
with extraterritorial transactions only if they were part of a plan to harm
American investors or markets."156
Thus, even assuming the validity of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, at least one version of this doctrine is compatible with
the effects test originally envisioned by the Second Circuit in transnational
securities litigation cases. The conclusion that Section 10(b) should apply
to securities transactions that display effects in the United States aligns
with the central thesis of this Article.
C Textual Doubts
In the debate over the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, Section 30(b) of the Act is often cited both in support and
in denial of the applicability of the antifraud provision to foreign
transactions. In relevant part, Section 30(b) provides that the Exchange
Act and any rule or regulation thereunder "shall not apply to any person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of
the United States," unless he does so in violation of SEC rules designed to
prevent "evasion" of the Act.157
The Supreme Court offers its own reading of Section 30(b) in Morrison,
arguing that Section 30(b) confirms the limitation of Section 10(b) to
domestic transactions.' 58 In reality, this Article argues that the first part of
Section 30(b) is, at best, neutral with respect to the issue of jurisdiction.
The text simply explains that the Exchange Act applies when it applies.
Conduct proscribed by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is, by definition,
covered by the Exchange Act and within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The fact that the Rule also contains an "anti-elusion" provision
does not seem sufficient to argue that the entire Act does not apply
extraterritorially.
152. 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[We shall assume that the Act does not cover
agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown
actually to have had some effect upon them.").
153. 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (indicating that a court will consider all available evidence before
applying the presumption against extraterritorial application of a U.S. law).
154. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 795-96 (emphasizing that the Sherman Act applies to "fomz~gn
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substandal effect in the United States')
(emphasis added).
155. 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
156. Id at 32 (emphasis added). See also Dodge, supra note 54, at 108-09 ("In short, Judge Bork
read the presumption as meaning that acts of Congress apply not to conduct that occurs in the
United States but to conduct that causes efects in the United States.") (emphasis added).
157. 15 U.S.C. S 78dd(b) (2006).
158. Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882-83 (2010).
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In response to this interpretation, Justice Scalia, in his opinion in
Monison, raises a rhetorical question: "[I]f the whole Act applied abroad,
why would the Commission's enabling regulation be limited to those
preventing 'evasion' of the Act, rather than all those preventing
'violation'?" 159 This question, however, confounds two different issues. To
illustrate, imagine a simple fictitious statute that provides for three rules:
(a) Section 1, which states that murder is prohibited and punished; (b)
Section 2, which requires administrative permission in order to possess
and use a firearm; and (c) Section 3, which provides that the statute applies
only to those who shoot a firearm within the jurisdiction of the United
States, or who do so in violation of the regulations issued to prevent
evasion of the statute by a special agency responsible for regulating firearm
possession and use. If, standing on the Mexican side of the border, Mr. X
shoots and kills Ms. Y in the United States, the conduct of Mr. X
represents a violation of the statute. Mr. X could also shoot from Mexico
to a straw target located in the United States and be in violation of the
statute. Section 3 of this hypothetical statute grants to the firearms agency
the authority to regulate this conduct as an evasion of Section 2, without
necessarily implying that Section 1 only applies to killers that shoot from
within the United States.
Applying this hypothetical to Section 30(b), the antievasion clause in
Section 30(b) could be considered a rule designed to "close the system"
and be interpreted as applicable to some provisions of the Exchange Act
that normally would not apply to conduct abroad. If, as this Article
advocates, Section 10(b) only applies to transactions that have an effect in
the United States, Section 30(b) would give to the commission the power
to regulate conduct abroad before that conduct causes any effect in the
United States. Yet, Section 30(b) does not provide a solid ground to
anchor any final conclusion as to the scope of application of Section 10(b).
Furthermore, Section 30(a) of the Exchange Act explicitly prohibits
certain conduct of brokers and dealers on foreign exchanges if the issuer is
a U.S. entity. The Court argues that the explicit mentioning of
extraterritorial application in Section 30(a) confirms that the rest of the
statute applies only domestically.160 This argument is also not persuasive.
Referring back to the hypothetical statute regulating murder and firearm
possession and use, the equivalent of Section 30(a) would be an additional
section that states that, if you are shooting from the United States into
Mexico without the agency's permission, then you are violating the law. It
clarifies a possible doubt and defines more clearly the scope of application
of the rule, but it does not mean that killing a person in the United States
159. Id. at 2882.
160. Id at 2883.
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while shooting from Mexico (in iolation of the hypothetical Section 1 of
the statute) is legal.
Accordingly, for the reasons above, the textual arguments advanced in
Morison based on the Exchange Act are not conclusive for the purpose of
excluding the application of Section 10(b) to conduct occurring outside the
United States that causes adverse consequences in this country.
D. Consisteng with Subject-MatterJurisdiction in Antitrust Cases
The question concerning the extraterritorial application of securities
laws presents some similarities with the issue of the extraterritorial reach of
antitrust legislation. Notwithstanding the obvious and profound
differences between these two substantive areas, in both situations
conduct in violation of American law can have - and often has -
international effects. The conduct and the damages that either type of case
might cause can occur either in the United States or abroad. Securities
fraud, as well as anticompetitive actions, can adversely affect separate but
connected markets. From this perspective, Hannah Buxbaum and other
scholars have examined transational litigation in antitrust and securities
laws in parallel.161
Contrary to the situation with securities regulation, Congress has
provided a clearer rule for international antitrust disputes. The Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 states that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over foreign conduct (a) where there is a "direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on markets in the United States and (b)
where the effect represents a cause of action under the Sherman Act.162 It
follows that American parties who suffered harm due to the domestic
effects of anticompetitive foreign conduct can always sue in the United
States. Foreign parties, on the other hand, have a cause of action only if
they can demonstrate that the harm suffered was the consequence of the
effects in the United States - and not abroad - of the illegal
behavior.163
In transnational antitrust litigation, statutory provisions and case law
thus adopt an "effects" test that stresses the consequences in the United
States of worldwide conduct. While this is certainly not a per se argument
against the Morrison transactional test, it is worth considering whether it is
sensibile to have two radically different approaches to the extraterritorial
161. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 273-78 (considering the application of jurisdictional law
to transnational antitrust and securities litigation). See also Erica Siegmund, Note, Exratenitoriay and
the Unique Analogy Between Muldtnational Anitrst and Securities Fraud Claims, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 1047
(2011) (using judicial treatment of the F-cubed securities fraud cases to draw an analogy with
transnational antitrust litigation).
162. 15 U.S.C. S 6(a) (2006).
163. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158-59 (2004).
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reach of the Sherman Act and of the Exchange Act. In both areas, the
existence of global, integrated markets suggests that adverse consequences
of foreign conduct can and should be sufficient to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. If conduct proscribed by the laws of country X causes adverse
effects in that country, X's courts should have adjudicative subject-matter
jurisdiction, regardless of where the conduct occured. This alternative
approach, in alignment with well-established principles of international
law, would partially reconcile the discrepancies created by Morrison between
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law and securities regulation.
E. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dangerous Uncertainties of the "U.S.
Exchange-Transaction" Test Versus Its Collateral Efects
In disposing of the conduct-effects test, the Supreme Court criticized
not only the excessive reach that the test allowed to American securities
laws, but also the unpredictable and inconsistent results it has created.164
The problem is that the cure offered (the new transactional test) is not
much better than the disease (the traditional conduct-effects test). More
precisely, depending on how the transactional test is interpreted, it can
either present ambiguities that are no less significant than the ones
embedded in the conduct-effects test or it can lead to an unacceptable
reduction of the protections offered by the securities laws to U.S.
investors.
To understand this statement, consider the following analytical reading
of the transactional test as stated in Justice Scalia's opinion: "[S]ection
10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an
American exchange, and the purchase or sale of any securities in the
United States." 65
The first question that this language raises is whether a transaction
involving American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) or American Depositary
Shares (ADSs), financial instruments listed in the United States that
represent foreign securities of a foreign issuer, would trigger Section
10(b).166 This question can be answered in the affirmative, considering that
both ADRs and ADSs ought to be deemed securities according to the
Howgy test.167
164. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2880-81 (2010).
165. Id at 2888.
166. On ADRs and ADSs, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Tranmnational
Lidgadon and Global Seaurifes Class-Action Lawsdias, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 465, 469-70, 476 (2009);
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The SEC and Fordgn Companies: A Balance of Compeaing Inters, 71 U. Prrr. L
REV. 457, 469 (2010); Marco Pagano et al.., The Geography of Equi Listing: Wby Do Companies List
Abroad?, 57J. FIN. 2651, 2660 (2002).
167. The Honey test asks "whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
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More important, and more central to this Article's discussion, is the
meaning of "purchase or sale . . . in the United States." Despite its
appeals to the need for a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court does not
seem to clearly and unequivocally define this expression. When does a
purchase or sale occur in the United States? A narrow reading suggests
that the contractual obligation to buy or sell securities must have arisen in
the United States. In other words, the contract must be executed in the
United States for Section 10(b) to apply. If, however, this is the correct
interpretation of the transactional test, it is difficult not to agree with the
concurring opinion in Momrison, signed by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
that states that the new rule would leave some American investors out in
the cold.168
For example, consider the following hypothetical. A, an elderly
American citizen and resident of New York City, is convinced by B, an
unscrupulous U.S. financier, to buy securities of a closely-held corporation
incorporated and doing business in California. All of their discussions,
tainted by extensive misrepresentations by B, occur in New York City. The
investor, however, is flown over to Nice, on the French Riviera, for the
closing of the deal and the signing of the contract. In this example,
applying a narrow reading of the transactional test, investor A could not
invoke the protections offered by the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
This outcome cannot be considered in line with the goal of the statute.1 69
The only logical alternative then would be to read something more into
the second prong of the transactional test. If, however, the expression
"purchase or sale of any securities in the United States" can be expanded
to include situations like the one described in the above hypothetical, we
are back at square one by giving relevance to the conduct.of the defendant,
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 301 (1946). The Court notes that this test "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek
the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Id. at 299.
168. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. See id. Apart from hypothetical situations, Moniron has already had concrete consequences in
the real world that can hardly be considered to be in the spirit of the Exchange Act. At the end of
September 2010, the Southern District Court of New York applied the transactional test from
Morriron in In r Societe Generak Seanities Litgadon, No. 08-CV-2495, 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2010). Judge Berman, deciding the controversy, not only held that Section 10(b) did not apply to
investors who purchased securities on a French stock exchange, but also that purchases of ADRs
negotiated over-the-counter in the United States were not covered by the antifraud provision. Id at
*6. In addition, parties have also begun to argue that under Monion, it is the location of the
transaction that matters, and thus, even American investors may not bring claims based on their
purchases of a foreign issuer's shares on a foreign exchange. See, e.g., UBS Defendants' Memorandum
of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss All Claims Based on Purchases of UBS Shares
Outside the United States at 15-17, In re UBS AG Securities Litig., No. 07-CV-11225, 2010 WL
3521486 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010).
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or to the effects of the transaction, in order to define the scope of
application of Section 10(b).
This outcome further adds to the reasons the Morrison decision is not
satisfactory and should not be considered persuasive. The transactional
test leaves us between a literal interpretation, which would lead to absurd
consequences, and a more flexible reading, which would reintroduce at
least some of the uncertainties of the conduct-effects test.
III. WHAT NEXT?
A. Congress Strikes Back. Maybe.
The day after the Morrison decision, a House-Senate Conference
Committee passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
better known as the Dodd-Frank Act.170 President Obama signed the Act
into law less than a month later.171 The question of subject-matter
jurisdiction and the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws was both on
the legislative agenda and in the final version of the bill. Two provisions in
the Act regulate this issue.
The first provision is Section 929P(b), which explicitly gives federal
courts jurisdiction over actions brought by the SEC or the Department of
Justice (DOJ) if conduct within the United States "constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors," or if
conduct occurring outside the United States "has a foreseeable substantial
effect within the United States."172 With respect to actions brought by the
SEC or the United States, Congress has therefore immediately
reestablished the conduct-effects test that the Supreme Court rejected in
Morrson.
This amendment to the securities laws, however, is not necessarily
incompatible with Morison. It is not surprising that enforcement agencies
and government branches are granted broader reach and stronger legal
instruments to seek damages than are private parties. From a strict
textualist point of view,. Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act could be
considered to confirm indirectly that, with the exception of SEC and DOJ
actions, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply to foreign-
170. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
171. Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, The Exratemitoial Reach of US. Seamere Law Aftr
the Morison Deddon and the Dodd-Frank Act, 16 WoRLD SEC. L. REP. 23 (2010), available at
http://www.bnai.coM/MorrisonDoddFrank/default.aspx.
172. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, S 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864.
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cubed transactions, even when there are effects or conduct in the United
States.
This is not the only possible reading. If read with a greater emphasis on
policy concerns, Section 929P(b) seems aimed at containing the possible
consequences of Moison. In addition, the fact that Congress expressly
opted for extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act in some cases
might be interpreted as another chink in the not-so-impenetrable armor of
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Through Section 929(b),
Congress has demonstrated that the conduct-effects test is not necessarily
a misconceived and ill-advised judicial creation, but rather a possible -
and indeed, useful - ground for jurisdiction.
The second relevant provision of the Dodd-Frank Act is Section 9 29 (y),
but the consequences of this Section are still tenuous. Section 92 9(y)
requires the SEC to conduct a study and solicit public comments on the
topic of the application of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to instances
where conduct in the United States constitutes a significant step in the
violation of the Act or where conduct occurring outside this country has a
substantial and foreseeable effect within the country.173 At the very least,
this provision demonstrates the skepticism and dissatisfaction of Congress
with the transactional test adopted by the Supreme Court. It is possible,
depending on the conclusion of the study, that further statutory or
secondary regulation will dispose of the transactional test even for private
litigation and reintroduce a different, clearer version of the old conduct-
effects test. This Article relies on this possibility to argue for the
introduction of a revised "effects test," discussed hereinafter.
B. A New Solution from Old Precedents: The Retised Effect Test
Before formally introducing this Article's proposal, it is helpful to
summarize the discussion. Part I overviewed the development of the
conduct-effects test, observing how the application of this judge-made
standard has sometimes led to conflicting and uncertain results. From
there, Part I sought to explain how courts mitigate the alleged dangers of
an overbroad extraterritorial application of Section 10(b). Importantly, Part
I explained that there are different legal devices that have been, and can
continue to be, used to keep the excessive proliferation of foreign-cubed
litigation at bay. Examples include the rules concerning class certification,
the requirement for proof of actual reliance, and the availability of the
doctrine offorum non conveniens. Part II then analyzed the transactional test
introduced by Morrison and discussed its flaws: the test's weak basis (in
terms of the Court's tenuous use of statutory interpretation and the
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes rationale), its
173. Id S 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871.
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inconsistency with the standards applied in the antitrust field, and -
most importantly - its narrowness and lack of predictable applicability
in future cases. Section III.A discussed the skepticism with which
Congress received the Morrison decision.
The stage is now set for a simple alternative proposal that has been
implicit in much of this Article. Specifically, an "effects-only" test should
be adopted. Put in other words, in order to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction and the existence of a private cause of action under Section
10(b), private plaintiffs should be required to plead that the illegal conduct
- a criterion borrowed from antitrust litigation - created direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects in the United States. SEC-
and DOJ-initiated actions could, meanwhile, be based on conduct in the
United States as now sanctioned by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Viewing this problem from a different perspective, this Article argues
that the "conduct test" was the primary cause of uncertainties and
excessive reach in the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.
To illustrate how the effects-only test would work, consider some
examples. First, as raised by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in
Morrison, there is the case of an American investor induced to invest in a
U.S. corporation by other Americans, but whose transaction occurred
abroad.174 Under the effects-only test, the American investor could invoke
the protection of the securities laws because the damages (that is, the
effect) of the illegal conduct occurred in the United States.175 On the other
hand, a pure foreign-cubed action could be sustained by a foreign plaintiff
against a foreign defendant in a U.S. court only when the illegal conduct
also produced consequences in the United States. This outcome would
likely be automatic if the securities affected by the fraud were listed
(directly or through ADRs) in the United States. The "effects" condition
could also be met if the securities were negotiated in the United States
without being listed, such as in an over-the-counter transaction or in
transactions where other holders of those securities were American
citizens or residents.176
174. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175. For example, under the Morison test, the American investor plaintiff in Schoembaum v.
Firsthrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1968), rer'd on rehearnig on other gronds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), would be barred from seeking relief under Section 10(b).
176. It should be noted that this is broader than the antitrust decision in F. Hofmann-.L Roche
Ltd. P. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). That holding merely stipulated that, when foreign
anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and foreign injury is independent of domestic effects,
Congress hoped America's antitrust laws would interact with those of other nations. Id at 169.
Erpagran justified this interpretation of congressional intent by noting that Congress would not have
tried to impose America's antitrust policies in the international marketplace for such ideas if it had
thought that such policies would not have been accepted. Id.
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Under the effects-only test, the situation left out of coverage under
Section 10(b) is the one in which the only contact with the United States is
conduct in this country that exclusively produces effects abroad. In this
case, a private (foreign) plaintiff could not use the American judiciary
system to recover the damages suffered. Of course, this approach would
not preclude jurisdiction in all cases because the SEC or the DOJ could
exercise its discretion in deciding, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,
whether to bring suit against these perpetrators. It seems reasonable that
the evaluation of this interest is left to the government given the likelihood
of legal recourse in the country where the effects occurred and the
inconvenience of having American courts deal with such matters.. The
SEC or DOJ could handle the exceptions to this general rule.
Needless to say, recognizing adjudicative jurisdiction and the existence
of a possible cause of action on the basis of effects in the United States
does not necessarily mean that foreign plaintiffs would be fully entitled to
their day in court. U.S. judges could still decide to not certify the class for
failure to meet the superiority requirement, to require actual proof of
reliance by not accepting the fraud-on-the-global-market theory, or to
dismiss on the basis offorum non conveniens.
C The Effect Test and Internatonal Law. A Comparatve View
A further advantage of the proposed effects-only test is that the test
would be in line with principles of international law and might facilitate an
international agreement on jurisdiction in securities cases. To understand
this concept, one must first establish the premise that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act have their antecedents in the common
law tort of fraud. 177 This Article contends that these rules codify, obviously
with some significant differences, a particular tort. Thus, in the language of
civil law countries, Section 10(b) and RulelOb-5 can be considered
"noncontractual obligations."
One of the most important and broadest international regulations of
jurisdiction for noncontractual obligations is contained in Regulation No.
44/2001 of the European Union.178 Pursuant to this Regulation, a plaintiff
can sue the defendant, in a claim based on a noncontractual obligation,
either where the defendant's domicile is located or, according to Article 5,
number 3, where the damaging effect occurred or could have occurred.179
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has actually interpreted this
177. Under the common law of torts, fraud is intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact with the intention of depriving a person of property or legal rights, or
otherwise causing injury. This definition has been adopted by statute in several states. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE S 6-11-20 (2006); CAL. CIV. CODE S 3294(c)(3) (2006).
178. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12).
179. Id art. 5(3).
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Regulation in a broader way, allowing the plaintiff to sue in the jurisdiction
where the prohibited conduct took place as well.180 In other words,
adjudicative jurisdiction can be established on the basis of an effects test
and, at least according to the ECJ case law, on the basis of conduct.
The effects test proposed in this Article would be consistent with this
approach. Conforming to an established principle of international
jurisdiction might promote a much-needed international agreement on
jurisdiction in the field of securities litigation, which currently suffers from
the uncertainty of which nation's laws will be applied when fraud or other
improprieties are alleged and the plaintiffs and defendants are not all of the
same nationality. This is thanks in considerable part to the continued
confusion under Morrison.181
CONCLUSION
Prominent jurists and other observers have long recognized the flaws in
the conduct-effects test and its preexisting constituent parts as traditionally
applied. Unfortunately, when the U.S. Supreme Court took the salutary
step of addressing these flaws in Morrison, it left the situation as confused
as it had been prior to its decision in Morrison. Not only will further
litigation be required to determine the scope of the decision, the two most
likely interpretations are inadequate. If the decision is interpreted narrowly,
the purpose of, not to mention the practical need for, U.S. securities laws
will be frustrated as American investors lose essential protections. If,
instead, the decision is interpreted broadly, the same ambiguities that
afflicted previous tests will afflict Monison's new transactional test.
Jurisdiction in international secirities regulation is far from just an
American problem - it is a problem spread across continents. This
Article's straightforward effects-only test would not only simplify
jurisdictional questions for American courts and those who consider
accessing them,. but its consonance with well-established jurisprudence in
other influential jurisdictions could promote an international accord
resolving, once and for all, the conflicts in international securities law
jurisdiction.
180. See, e.g., Case C-18/02, Danmarks Rederiforening v. LO Landsorganisation i Sverige, 2004
E.C.R. I-1; Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse, 1976 E.C.R. 1735.
181. See Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 171 ("Because the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act are limited to actions by the SEC or the United States, the 'transactional test'
set forth by the Supreme Court in Moriron clearly remains in effect for private actions brought under
the Securities Exchange Act. The transactional test most certainly provides a sharper picture
regarding the application of U.S. securities laws. However, even from the facts set forth in Morison, it
is clear that the fuzzy edges of this bright-line rule will be drawn into focus only through further
litigation.").
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Instead of looking at where conduct took place regardless of where that
conduct had its effects, or at some combination of the locations of
conduct and effects, a pure effects test will limit American courts'
jurisdiction to those cases in which the United States has a substantial
interest. The already-granted authority possessed by federal agencies to
pursue violators whose conduct takes place domestically but which has
exclusively foreign effects will ensure that the United States does not
become a haven for those defrauding international investors.
